The paper tests the effectiveness of marginal reserve requirements employed by the Japanese authorities in the 1970s to influence short-term capital flows, thereby contributing to the ongoing debate on the use of capital controls-market-or price-based ones in particular. While the case for using market-based controls almost entirely relies on the mixed evidence from the experience of Chile with unremunerated reserve requirements in the 1990s, testing for their effectiveness on the volume of inflows is hampered by the endogeneity of such a measure, which is typically imposed or intensified when inflows surge. We address this problem by applying the method of propensity score matching and find that an increase in marginal reserve requirements modestly reduced the volume of short-term capital inflows through non-resident free-yen accounts. The impact was not statistically significant, however, implying that the price elasticity of short-term capital flows was small. We conclude that market-based controls must be nearly prohibitive, perhaps combined with administrative measures, to be effective in a meaningful way.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper applies the method of propensity score matching to test the effectiveness of marginal reserve requirements employed by the Japanese authorities in the 1970s to influence short-term capital flows, thereby contributing to the ongoing debate on the use of capital controls-market-or price-based ones in particular. Use of capital controls, once condemned by the mainstream thinking of the economics profession, has assumed greater respectability in recent years (IEO 2004) . Following the global financial crisis of 2007-08, moreover, it has become increasingly accepted as a legitimate tool of protecting domestic financial markets from the vicissitude of cross-border capital flows (Ostry et al. 2011) ; the Group of Twenty (G20) finance ministers and central bank governors in October 2011, calling capital controls "residency-based capital flow management measures (CFMs)," stated that these and other CFMs "may constitute part of a broader approach to protect economies from shocks" and "can complement and be employed alongside, rather than substitute for, appropriate monetary, exchange rate, foreign reserve management and prudential policies." 1 There is a long-standing debate on the effectiveness of capital controls especially as countries liberalize international payments (Dooley 1996; Edwards 1999; Magud and Reinhart 2006; Habermeier et al. 2011 ). An open current account allows disguised capital flows through leads and lags in current payments and receipts as well as through under-and over-invoicing. As the capital account is progressively liberalized, additional room is created for substitution between different types of capital flows, so that a measure to control one type of flows is to some extent offset by an increase in other types. As long as a country is committed to the principle of -2 -free trade, there is a natural limit to how much it can feasibly control external payments and receipts, making it necessary to exempt certain types of capital transactions, such as trade credits or foreign direct investment (FDI) . Inevitably, these would create a channel through which otherwise controlled capital inflows could take place. The longer controls are in place, the more creative economic agents will become in finding ways to circumvent them.
The philosophical question of whether capital controls should or could be used under certain circumstances is different from the practical issue of whether they are effective and, if so, whether the benefits outweigh the costs. Some, arguing against the use of capital controls, have based their case on the idea that administrative controls must be progressively tightened to remain effective over time and, in view of the potential for substitution, will become increasingly distortionary (e.g, Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez 1993) . It is in this context that so-called marketor price-based controls have become the favorite device of emerging market economies. Such controls, instead of resorting to administrative interventions, attempt to influence capital flows through the incentives of market participants and are thus considered less distortionary. In 1991, Chile became the first country in recent history to introduce such a mechanism, called unremunerated reserve requirements (URR), which required a percentage of relevant inflows to be deposited in a non-interest-bearing account at the central bank for a certain period of time.
The countries that have followed Chile in introducing URRs or other similar devices in recent years include, among others, Colombia (1993 Colombia ( , 2007 , Slovenia (1995) , Croatia (2004 ), Russia (2004 , Thailand (2006) and, in the aftermath of the global crisis, Brazil (2009) and Korea (2011) .
The generally favorable view of market-based controls within the policymaking community had been evident even before the use of capital controls became widely accepted.
This came about from around 1996 when a substantial empirical literature began to emerge on -3 - the effectiveness of the Chilean URR. Although a review of the literature by Nadal- De Simone and Sorsa (1999) cautioned against prematurely accepting the Chilean experience as supportive of the effectiveness of such controls, most had interpreted the body of empirical evidence to believe that the URR had lengthened the maturity of capital inflows (if not reduced the total volume). Subsequent studies tended to be more supportive of the volume effect as well (Gallego et al. 2002; Le Fort and Lehman 2003) . Fischer (2001) , speaking on behalf of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), expressed support for "the use of market-based capital inflow controls:
for example, those that impose a tax on capital inflows."
The case for market-based controls, however, rests almost entirely on a particular interpretation of the experience of the Chilean URR, the effectiveness of which "has often been exaggerated" (Edwards 1999) . The available evidence on other countries is far from favorable.
For example, Concha et al. (2011) suggest that the Colombia URR had no impact on either the volume or the composition of inflows for 1998-2008, a period that covers both the URR of 1993 and that of 2007 (though Cardenas and Barrera (1997) is more favorable to the compositional impact). Likewise, Clements and Kamil (2009) , covering only the URR of 2007, show that the Colombian measure, while reducing external borrowing, had no impact on the much more significant, overall volume of non-FDI inflows. Coelho and Gallagher (2010) and Jittrapanum and Prasartset (2009) find evidence of a negative impact of the Thai URR on inflows, but the impact was either economically small or statistically not significant; moreover, the reduction in net inflows may have been achieved, not by limiting inflows, but through capital flight. Aside from the potential endogeneity of capital controls (i.e., controls are strengthened when inflows surge), the ambiguity of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of marketbased controls is hardly surprising. After all the effectiveness of any measure depends, among other things, on the administrative capacity of the country concerned, the willingness of market participants to comply with the requirements, and the scope for substitution and circumvention, as determined by the coverage of the measure as well as country-specific conditions (Hebermeier et al. 2011) . These conditions, for example, include the restrictiveness of the capital account regime, the sophistication of financial markets, including the extent to which derivative instruments are available, transactions costs involving a structure of fees and legal procedures, and the strength of incentives provided by interest rate differentials favoring domestic instruments and the prospect of economic growth over the medium term. In order to understand what measure works under what circumstances, and how it works when it does, we must sort out these factors and isolate the impact of each. This is where the experience of Japan in the 1970s becomes helpful.
Japan's use of a market-based control in the 1970s predates the Chilean URR by two decades or more. At that time, Japan had a highly closed capital account, with all capital transactions in principle subject to approval, though the process of capital account liberalization meant that the presumption of approval was applied to an increasing number of transactions. The exception was short-term capital flows through non-resident free-yen accounts (FYAs) held at a small number of commercial banks that the Ministry of Finance had authorized to do foreign exchange business. Foreign investors were freely allowed to move funds into and out of Japan -5 - through FYAs without any formality. Free-yen deposits (FYDs) provided foreign investors with a vehicle of investing in yen assets (though purchasing domestic securities with the funds would have required approval), while Japanese banks used them as an additional source of funding.
Only when the pace of capital inflows surged did authorities introduce or raise reserve requirements on FYDs. The measure was rescinded when capital inflows abated.
This experience of Japan provides a kind of controlled experiment in which to isolate the effectiveness of a market-based capital control by removing the influences of factors other than changes in the price incentive itself. Japan's closed capital account, administrative capacity in the environment of a strong regulatory culture, and high degree of legal compliance (especially given the fact that the control applied to a small number of tightly regulated banks as intermediaries) meant that there was little room for substitution among different types of capital transactions. For foreign investors, FYDs were the only vehicle of freely investing in the Japanese financial market. If the authorities imposed or raised reserve requirements, banks became less willing to accept new deposits. But foreign investors, who were thus cut out of the deposit market, had no other means of entering the Japanese market. We believe that, by analyzing how changes in the balance of FYDs responded to changes in the reserve requirements, we gain insight into how market-based controls do or do not work in practice and the conditions required to make them work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the origin and other specifics of non-resident free-yen accounts and explains the institutional arrangement under which short-term capital flows in general were regulated in Japan prior to the de jure opening of Japan's capital account in 1980. Section III presents a preliminary analysis of the impact of capital control measures on FYD flows, by identifying capita control episodes and using an event -6 -study methodology. In testing how the behavior of FYD flows differed between the capital control and the non-capital control episodes, the section uses as the counterfactual the sample average rate of increase in FYDs and the rate of increase obtained from a simple prediction model. Section IV estimates the average treatment effect of what we identify as intensive capital controls by the method of propensity score matching. In particular, we estimate a probit model of the probability of intensive controls and, in identifying the counterfactual for each capital control episode, use the probit score to find the closest match. Finally, section V presents concluding remarks.
II. NON-RESIDENT FREE-YEN ACCOUNTS AS A CHANNEL OF SHORT-TERM CAPITAL FLOWS
The system of non-resident free-yen accounts was established on 1 July 1960 in order to provide non-residents with a means to keep the proceeds from current exports to Japan in yen.
Along with the authorization to use the yen as a currency of trade settlement, this marked the modest beginning of the yen as an international currency. The non-resident holders of FYAs at authorized foreign exchange banks were freely allowed to take the deposits out of the country at any time. Thus, this also represented the establishment of external convertibility for the yen.
These decisions came about against the background of foreign pressure to liberalize Japan's trade and payment system as the Japanese economy had recovered from the devastation of World War II and had recorded a double-digit growth year after year. Pressure intensified after major West European countries had restored external convertibility for their currencies at the end of 1958. The establishment of free-yen accounts and the authorization for the yen to be used for trade settlement purposes were the very first measures implemented under the Trade and Payments Liberalization Plan announced by the Japanese government in June 1960 (JMOF 1999).
The establishment of FYAs had far-reaching implications. Because accounts could be opened not only with yen proceeds from current exports to Japan but also with the sale of foreign exchange to onshore banks, this meant that non-residents could freely bring short-term capital into Japan through the banking system. In this sense, Japan's capital account liberalization followed a non-standard sequence, by liberalizing short-term capital flows before FDI and longterm portfolio flows; 3 the liberalization of short-term capital flows even predated the full opening of the current account in 1964 (Takagi 1997). Free-yen deposit rates were subject to maximum ceilings stipulated by law, which could be higher or lower than the prevailing world interest rates. Overseas branches of Japanese banks also participated in this market, by transferring Eurodollar deposits, converting them into yen, and depositing the proceeds with the head offices.
-8 -liabilities) in order to discourage inflows. The primary purpose of the liquidity requirements, however, was prudential. According to Inuta (2000) , they were for the most part not binding on the behavior of foreign exchange banks, especially after 1966 (when the rate was reduced to 15 percent), because most banks for internal risk management purposes kept a sufficiently high share of their external liabilities in liquid foreign currency assets in any case.
Second, from 1964 to 1972, the Japanese authorities applied outright quantitative controls on the amount of new short-term capital inflows, including through FYAs. This required, for each bank, the ratio of external liabilities to external assets to remain within the ratio actually achieved during a particular period in the past. Basically, what this intended was to allow an increase in external liabilities, only to the extent that the banks were willing to increase external lending, thereby limiting the net inflow of short-term funds. Third, in 1968, the authorities introduced a limit on the amount of so-called "yen conversion," defined as the amount obtained by subtracting the balance of relevant foreign assets from the balance of relevant external liabilities. The amount of yen conversion essentially refers to the amount of foreign borrowing that could be lent out to domestic borrowers. Under this regulation, which was to be terminated under the Japan-US Yen-Dollar agreement in 1984 (Frankel 1984) , the authorities determined the yen conversion limit for banks on a monthly average basis (initially 103 percent of the
Assets Liabilities Foreign currency assets (A) Foreign currency liabilities (B)
Non-resident free-yen deposits (C)
The amount of yen conversion is equivalent to B + C -A. In December 1973, free-yen deposits were excluded from the liabilities side except for the claims to overseas branches of Japanese banks.
-9 -average balance during December 1967 and January 1968). The yen conversion limit was tightened over time as speculation built up on the sustainability of the Bretton Woods parities. 6 Our assessment of market-based capital controls in Japan covers the period 1971-79, and is based not on the foreign currency liquidity requirements on all short-term inflows (which changed only three times during 1963-1966) but on the average and marginal reserve requirements on FYDs, which replaced the liquidity requirements in June 1972. Not only do the newly introduced reserve requirements provide a richer set of data for our purpose (as they were changed no less than 9 times in a variety of circumstances over a 7-year period), but the period 1971-79 is one in which a transparent legal framework replaced the opaque "window guidance"
of the 1960s.
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Except at the very beginning, non-resident free-yen deposits during most of our sample period were subject to two sets of regulations: (i) yen conversion limits and (ii) statutory reserve requirements. The application of these regulations changed in response to the tightening or easing of pressure on the exchange rate as well as the size and direction of net capital inflows. 
III. THE IMPACT OF CONTROL MEASURES ON FYD FLOWS: AN EVENT STUDY
We have grouped these and other control measures taken with respect to free-yen deposits over 1971-79 into nine "episodes," which are summarized with dates and additional details, where relevant, in Table 1 . It was necessary to cluster two or more measures into a single event because they were taken very close to each other, making it impossible to isolate the impact of one from that of the other(s). The first two episodes concerned (the tightening or easing of) the application of yen-conversion limits and a quantitative restriction. The next two involved a market-based measure (a change in average or marginal reserve requirements) combined with a change in the application of yen conversion limits, while the remaining five episodes entailed only a market-based measure. Strictly speaking, the concurrent use by the Japanese authorities of non-market-based controls may to some extent diminishes the integrity of our tests to measure the impact of changes in reserve requirements on FYD flows, but we believe -12 -that the problem is not so serious especially if we use monthly data as we do. Except for the imposition or elimination of a quantitative ceiling, the non-market-based measures in all other cases only involved a change in the way the benchmark balance was calculated, whether daily or monthly, and no change was made in the yen conversion limit itself. In a later section, when we estimate the impact of controls on FYDs, we exclude the first two episodes in one specification to focus on the impact of market-based controls alone.
In assessing the impact of these measures on FYD flows, we must note that the FYD balance steadily rose over the period, increasing from a mere 350 billion yen in January 1971 to Obviously, the simplest counterfactual would be the average rate of increase in FYDs obtained from the sample. An event study was performed on this basis (Table 2 ). In view of the limited number of events, we perform no formal test except to note whether each event was
"successful" or "not successful" relative to the counterfactual. In particular, we judge a Alternatively, following a model used by Fratzscher (2009) for exchange rate forecasting,
we can obtain the counterfactual from a simple linear prediction model, such as:
Where t is a time subscript; i refers to the i th factor; k t r + is the realized rate of change in the balance of FYDs over the forthcoming k months; α k and β k are coefficients for the k th period ahead; ε is a while-noise error; t i F , , a set of factors (explanatory variables), is assumed to include: the 3-month moving average rate of change in FYD, 3-month moving average Japan--14 -U.S. interest rate differential favoring Japanese instruments, 9 The model is estimated separately for each time horizon, by using the sample that excludes the observations for the event and three succeeding months. The results of an event study based on the predicted value of FYDs as the counterfactual are summarized in Table 3 .
Compared to the results based on the sample mean rates of increase as the counterfactual, the success rate for one-month changes declines (from 4 to 3) while that for three-month changes rises (from 2 to 4). Given the fact that the first event represents perhaps the tightest measure (enforced by a quantitative ceiling), this result in which it was found successful for both onemonth and two-month changes appears more plausible. Likewise, the 7 th event also represents an intensively tight control measure (an introduction of marginal reserve requirements at 50 percent). It makes therefore intuitive sense that, with the counterfactual obtained from a prediction model, the 7 th event becomes successful though only for the two-month horizon. For the one-month horizon, the event (the second event) that was found successful with the sample mean rate of change but ceased to be successful with the counterfactual calculated from the prediction model, involved an easing of the controls in place. 9 The interest rates are the Treasury bill rate for the US and its equivalent for Japan.
-15 -and 8 th episodes of controls does not change whether we use the predicted value or the sample average as the counterfactual.
IV. ESTIMATING THE AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT BY PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING
The event study methodology we have employed has three conceptual problems. First, the number of events is too small to test the statistical significance formally. Second, the choice of counterfactual is rather arbitrary. Finally, as a consequence, it is not capable of dealing with the problem of endogeneity (as the incidence or tightening of a capital control tends to coincide with increasing free-yen deposits). In econometric terms, this is the problem of self-selection. To the extent that capital controls are introduced precisely because short-term capital inflows are surging, a failure to account for this endogeneity is likely to bias our assessment against concluding that the capital controls were effective.
To address this problem, we use the methodology of propensity score matching, whose basic idea is to identify as the counterfactual a similar episode in which capital inflows surged but no control was imposed. Propensity score matching was developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and has been used widely in the program evaluation literature (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) . More recently, the methodology has also been applied successfully to monetary and international economics, for example, by Glick et al. (2006) (capital controls and currency crises),
Lin and Ye (2007) (inflation targeting) and Fatum and Hutchison (2010) (foreign exchange market intervention)
. The advantage of this methodology is that it can formally control for the non-random selection problem while avoiding need to specify the functional form because it is nonparametric (Heckman et al., 1998; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009 ).
-16 -The empirical literature employing a variety of propensity score matching methods is often called the treatment effect literature, because it involves testing the difference between "treated" observations (those for which there is a presumed impact of the event or measure concerned) and "control" (non-treated but otherwise similar) observations (in order to avoid confusion with "capital control," we avoid using the term "control observations" in the rest of the paper) In the terminology of this literature, therefore, what we attempt to do is to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of a market-based capital control measure on the volume of FYD flows.
Our assessment of the effectiveness of capital controls is based on the average treatment effect of what we call "intense" capital controls (which excludes the introduction of average reserve requirements at 0.25 percent, which would remain in place until December 1980). These are not events, as was the case previously, but periods or succession of months where the controls measures were in place. Because an easing of controls essentially represents the absence of controls, an episode of easing can only be considered to be part of the non-treated sample.
Specifically, the "treated" observations (for which controls were applied intensively) include: (i)
August-November 1971; (ii) May 1972-November 1973; and (iii) November 1977-January 1979.
These correspond to the periods when a maximum limit was imposed on the outstanding balance of free-yen deposits, marginal reserve requirements on free-yen deposits were 25% or higher, or the yen conversion limit was strengthened. Except for the first episode, the tightening of control entailed a change in the price incentive, with any administrative measure playing a secondary role.
By observing how the balance of FYDs changed from month to month (Figure 3 ), we find no clear pattern that the rate of increase was consistently negative during the months of -17 -intense capital controls (indicated by the shaded areas). During the first episode (when the controls were entirely administrative), the rate of increase did fall but the fall started prior to the intensification of controls and it started to rise before the tightened controls were eased. Nor is there evidence to suggest that rate of increase was smaller during the periods of intensive controls than the rate of increase during the other months. Rather, except for the latter part of the second episode, the rate of increase in FYDs appears to be generally larger when the controls were intensive.
Formally, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) defined as:
where T is the dummy variable for treatment ( (1) is that the second term on the right-hand side ( ) is not observable, that is to say, the key point is to identify the counterfactual for
. If we assume that the treatment decision (i.e., the imposition of intensive controls) is random, the sample mean of the outcome for the non-treated reference group
) can be used to estimate the ATT (Table 4) . Then, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the imposition of intensive controls raised (rather than reduced) the rate of increase in FYDs at the 10 percent significance level. This is consistent with what we have 10 Both continuous and discrete scalar variables can be applied as the outcome variable in the estimation of the average treatment effect. In this analysis, only one of the potential outcomes is observed for each i, and the other is unobserved or missing. The unobserved outcome is called the counterfactual outcome (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) . The matching estimators impute the missing potential outcome by using average outcomes for observations with similar values of covariates.
-18 -previously gathered from looking at Figure 3 . When all non-treated observations are used as the reference group, the capital controls had only a small impact, if any, on the volume of short-term capital flows through FYDs.
The problem of this approach is obvious because the imposition of intensive controls is in practice not random. If the treatment decision (i.e., the imposition of intensive controls) is systematically correlated with a set of observable covariates that also affect the outcome, the estimate of the ATT will be biased (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) .
To identify the second term on the right-hand side of equation (1), conditional independence must first be assumed as follows:
The conditional independence (or unconfoundedness) assumption implies that, given the pretreatment variables or covariates X, the treatment assignment is independent of the potential outcomes. Therefore, for observations with similar values of X, the treatment assignment is random with respect to the potential outcomes. We further assume the following so-called common support (or overlap) condition:
where
is the conditional probability of adopting the treatment given the observed covariates X. This probability is what is commonly called a "propensity score." This condition requires the existence of some comparable reference observations for each treatment observation.
11 According to Heckman et al. (1998) , we only need to assume that -19 -Under the conditional independence assumption and the common support condition, as specified above, equation (1) can be rewritten as
for the non-treated observations.
One matching method, called covariate matching, pairs the treated observations with the nontreated observations with similar observed values of covariates X. This method, however, is difficult to implement when the set of covariates X is large.
To overcome the high-dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose matching based on their propensity scores, which are the probabilities of treatment assignment conditional on X and can be estimated using logit or probit models. This matching is called the "propensity score matching" method. It applies the conditional independence assumption on the propensity score (
and matches the treated observations to the nontreated observations on the basis of the one-dimensional variable ) ( i X P , instead of the multidimensional vector X. Using propensity score matching, the ATT can then be estimated as
By pairing each treated observation to non-treated observations with similar propensity scores, this methodology can eliminate sample selection bias to identify a credible counterfactual in the estimation of the ATT (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) . Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest that the probability of adopting a treatment should be estimated by using observed pre-treatment variables (pre-treatment characteristics). To obtain the probability of adopting a treatment at time t, we thus use a set of covariates X at time t-1.
-20 -This means that equation (5) can be represented (by replacing subscript i with as a time
In what follows, we proceed in the following sequence. First, we estimate the probability of an intensive capital control by using a probit model, where the dependent variable takes the value of one (when the control is intensified) or zero (otherwise). Second, we estimate the average treatment effect of intensive capital controls on FYD flows by calculating the mean difference in outcomes between the treated and the non-treated observations based on propensity score matching.
In finding the right non-treated matches for the treated observations, we employ nearestneighbor and radius matching methods. The nearest-neighbor method (with replacement) pairs each treated observation with a non-treated observation with the closest propensity score. In contrast, the radius method pairs a treated observation with all non-treated observations with estimated propensity scores falling within a specified radius r (Dehejia and Wahba 2002): r=0.005, r=0.01, r=0 .05 in our case. Use of four matching methodologies is intended as a robustness check, as no matching method is ideal for all situations (Imbens 2004; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) . The common support condition is imposed, however, in the application of both types of matching methods, namely, we drop the non-treated observations whose estimated propensity scores are lower than the lowest score among the treated observations or higher than the highest score among the treated observations (Becker and Ichino 2002) .
A probit model of the probability of an intensive capital control was estimated, with the following explanatory variables: the 3-month moving average monthly rate of change in FYD at time t-1, the 3-month moving average exchange market pressure index (EMPI) at time t-1, the 3--21 -month moving average Japan-U.S. interest rate differential at time t-1, the 3-month moving average rate of increase in industrial production at time t-1, and a dummy variable for the postSmithsonian floating exchange rate period (i.e., after February 1973).
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In all four specifications, the coefficients of EMPI is negative and significant, suggesting that as the yen faced appreciation pressure the probability of introducing an intensive control rose. Except for the third specification, the coefficient of industrial production is positive and significant, implying that as the economy expanded the probability of imposing a capital control rose, presumably to mitigate pressure on the exchange rate. Likewise, except for the third specification, the coefficient of the floating regime dummy is negative and significant. This means that the authorities were more prone to use capital controls when the exchange rate was fixed (this result does not obtain in the third specification because it excludes the fixed exchange EMPI is as defined previously. To ensure robustness, we estimated four different specifications of the model by the maximum likelihood method, namely, the full model (denoted as [1] rate period of -November 1973 . On the other hand, the coefficient of the interest rate differential is negative and significant. While this may be counterintuitive (if it means that an increase in the relative rate of return on domestic assets led to a decline in the volume of inflows), the overall results in all specifications are found to satisfy the critical balancing property (Becker and Ichino 2002) , namely that the distributional properties of the covariates are similar between the treated and non-treated observations.
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The ATT of intensive capital controls on FYD flows can then be estimated on the basis of the matched samples (Table 6 ). Matching was carried out separately based on the estimated propensity scores from each version of the probit model, as reported in the ATT is estimated to be negative. This means that, with the application of propensity score matching, the overall results become more favorable to the effectiveness of capital controls (in Table 4 , the ATT obtained without propensity score matching was 1.575 and nearly significant at the 10 percent level). Even in the least favorable case ([2B]), ATT (0.49) is smaller.
13 Lin and Ye (2007) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest that the purpose of the probit estimation is not to explain accurately the probability of treatment choice but to control effectively for the covariates that affect the treatment choice and the outcome. 14 In the case of matching with replacement, each non-treated observation can be matched more than once. Matching with replacement increases the average quality of matching by increasing the set of possible matches (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) . 15 This was done by using the Stata ado-file of Becker and Ichino (2002) .
-23 -that the controls were not effective) was excluded. Focusing on the bottom of the table where the estimates from model [4] are reported, we find no evidence that the results are sensitive to the exclusion or inclusion of the first episode of administrative controls from the sample. On this basis, we conclude that while the market-based controls had only a marginal, if any, impact on the volume of short-term capital flows. This may mean that the price elasticity of short-term capital inflow is small, so that market-based controls may need to become prohibitive, perhaps accompanied by administrative measures, to be effective in a meaningful way.
V. CONCLUSION
We have tested the effectiveness of marginal reserve requirements used by Japan in the 1970s to influence short-term capital flows through free-yen deposits. Capital controls, marketbased ones in particular, are receiving increasing respectability in the policy making community as a legitimate tool of protecting domestic financial markets from the vicissitude of cross-border capital flows, but the case for them almost entirely relies on the mixed evidence from the experience of Chile with unremunerated reserve requirements in the 1990s. We contribute to the ongoing debate on the use of capital controls by providing evidence from the experience of Japan in the 1970s when the capital account was closed except for short-term capital flows through FYDs.
Testing for the effectiveness of a capital control on the volume of inflows is notoriously difficult because of the endogeneity of such a measure, which is typically imposed or intensified precisely when inflows surge. Thus, unless we address this problem, any assessment of effectiveness is biased against concluding that the measure was effective. We applied the method of propensity score matching to account for the endogeneity, and found that an increase in marginal reserve requirements only modestly reduced the volume of short-term capital inflows -24 -through non-resident free-yen accounts. This was in contrast to the results that obtained when the endogeneity was not properly controlled for. Even so, the impact was not statistically significant, implying that the price elasticity of short-term capital flows was small. We conclude that marketbased controls must be nearly prohibitive, perhaps combined with administrative measures, to be effective in a meaningful way. 1971M5 1971M9 1972M1 1972M5 1972M9 1973M1 1973M5 1973M9 1974M1 1974M5 1974M9 1975M1 1975M5 1975M9 1976M1 1976M5 1976M9 1977M1 1977M5 1977M9 1978M1 1978M5 1978M9 1979M1 1979M5 1979M9 1980M1 1980M5 1980M9 Figure 3 1971M5 1971M9 1972M1 1972M5 1972M9 1973M1 1973M5 1973M9 1974M1 1974M5 1974M9 1975M1 1975M5 1975M9 1976M1 1976M5 1976M9 1977M1 1977M5 1977M9 1978M1 1978M5 1978M9 1979M1 1979M5 1979M9 1980M1 1980M5 1980M9 -30 - Note: The index (T) takes the value of one for: August-November 1971; -November 1973 and November 1977-January 1979. -33 - Notes: The numbers in parentheses are z-statistics, which are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % levels, respectively. Note: ATT is the mean difference between the treated (with intensive capital controls) and the non-treated (without such controls) observations in terms of monthly changes in free-yen deposits. We employ propensity score matching based on the estimated probit model of Table 5 to choose the non-treated observations against which the treated observations are compared.
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